The Yugoslav nuclear programme and the impact of political factors on its failure

In the post-war period, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was among the first countries to pursue an independent nuclear weapons programme. The initial efforts were centred around experts from the Vinča Institute and the politician Aleksandar Ranković. However, limited technical progress, political instability within the federal government, and the Chernobyl nuclear disaster ultimately brought an end to Yugoslavia’s nuclear ambitions. In addition to these factors, the failure of the programme was significantly influenced by the internal political transformations that took place in the SFRY after the mid-1960s. The process of confederalisation, which led to the increasing dominance of the federal republics’ and autonomous provinces’ particular interests at the expense of shared national objectives, played a crucial role. This article specifically examines the impact of confederalisation on the termination of the nuclear programme, offering a novel perspective compared to previous studies on the subject. The study gathers and analyses data related to the development of the Yugoslav nuclear programme, presenting its chronology and evaluating the political dynamics that led to its collapse. The central hypothesis is that the internal political shifts resulting from the country’s confederalisation – formalised with the 1974 constitutional reforms – directly contributed to the abandonment of the military nuclear programme. To test this hypothesis, the authors draw upon existing scholarship, archival materials, and four primary sources, including interviews with direct participants in the Yugoslav nuclear programme. This research not only provides a foundation for further study but also holds broader relevance for comparative political science, offering insights into contemporary military, economic, and political alliances where strategic projects remain subjects of debate.